We (e.g., tents, blankets, etc.), and consumable supplies (e.g., food, water, medicine, etc.). A case study for the southeastern United States illustrates the use of the model.
Introduction
Extreme events such as tornadoes, earthquakes, hurricanes, or floods can strike a community with little or no warning and can leave high levels of devastation behind. Large quantities of supplies are needed in the aftermath of such events, and emergency response efforts may become ineffective if supplies are unavailable. Supplies may be acquired from other regions, but may need to travel long distances, incurring high costs and taking too long to reach the victims. Roads may be obstructed, destroyed and unavailable. Casualties may increase because of secondary effects such as aftershocks, building collapse or just lack of medical assistance.
For the purpose of risk mitigation and decrease in response time, pre-positioning strategies are already in use by the military armed forces and utility service providers (e.g. electricity). Pre-positioning strategies provide the military with flexibility, safety and speed of response against emerging threats in various geographic locations [10, 15] . Electric utilities may store spare parts (e.g. capacitors) to increase the reliability of the network [5, 12, 14] , and also allocate their maintenance force to minimize the recovery period after a major outage event [7] .
Efforts in emergency response have concentrated mainly on disaster management following natural disasters, terrorist attacks and hazardous materials accidents [1, 6, 16] . Their main goal has been to develop emergency response plans that integrate information pertaining to the location and capacities of resource providers, the spatial distribution of the victims, the environment and the economy [16] . Even though the location and capacities of the resource providers are key components in the disaster management plan, little research has been conducted on the topic of a priori planning -i.e. what resources should be stockpiled in which locations so that emergency response is most effective in the event that it is needed.
Our focus is on a priori emergency response planning determining strategic locations for pre-positioning supplies and allocating stacks of material to those locations. A two-stage stochastic mixed integer program (SMIP) model is presented. This model takes into consideration uncertain demand from disastrous events striking different areas in the network, the fixed costs associated with the addition of storage facilities of different capacities, the resource purchase costs, and the shipping costs or travel times. A more complete illustration of the problem is presented via a case study in section 2, followed by the model formulation in section 3. The solution of the case study problem is presented in section 4. We provide conclusions and directions for ongoing work in section 5.
An Illustrative Problem Setting
The Atlantic Oceanographic and Meteorological Laboratory (AOML), a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) research facility, estimates that an average of 5.9 hurricanes strike the Atlantic Basin (East and Gulf coast states) each year, with an average of 2.2 being major hurricanes [2] . The impacts caused by such disasters affect many aspects of the region's infrastructures and economy. We will use the southeastern states as an illustration of the problem context and as motivation for the model formulation to be presented in Section 3.
The network used in this illustrative analysis ( Figure  1 ) includes major cities of the Gulf coast states, as listed in Table 1 . For purposes of illustration, we have defined a set of potential damage scenarios based on eight historical hurricanes that have struck this area. The historical storms include four major hurricanes (Alicia, Camille, Andrew and Opal) and four less severe hurricanes (Lili, Isabel, Bonnie and Floyd). 21 scenarios were developed with assigned probabilities of occurrence as shown in Table 2 . The scenarios include both single storms and combinations of storms. The probabilities assigned to the scenarios are based on approximately matching aggregate historical characteristics of hurricanes in this region, but should be treated as simply illustrative values.
In a larger scale analysis, one would likely want to include more than 21 scenarios to reflect the uncertainty in possible future outcomes. We have limited this example analysis to a small number in order to illustrate the character of the problem, the model and its solution, without creating excessive computational requirements. For each of these scenarios, damage levels and locations were estimated, based on damage assessment reports [17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25] provided by NOAA for the historical storms. For purposes of this illustrative analysis, we have limited our attention to just three types of emergency supplies: food, water and medical kits. Demands for these three commodities in each scenario are based on the number of people sheltered in various locations for the historical storms. Table 3 summarizes units of the various commodities required in specific cities for each of the eight historical storms. The units have been scaled for convenient representation (water demand is in thousands of gallons, for example). Demands for scenarios that include combinations of storms are the sum of individual storm demands. The scenario definitions also include damage to the transportation network, represented by reductions in capacity on links in the network shown in Figure 1 . Links can either be "damaged" (a 50% reduction in capacity) or "destroyed" (complete loss of capacity).
In addition, if supplies are pre-positioned at given nodes in the network, they may be either partially or completely lost as a result of a specific storm. We differentiate between storage facilities being "damaged" (50% loss of all commodities stored there) or "destroyed" (complete loss). Table 4 summarizes the damage to the transportation infrastructure and potential storage facilities under the various storms used to construct the scenarios. Given the network (with associated transportation costs and distances) and the scenarios (with associated demands, potential losses of material, and damage to the transportation capacity), our interest is to determine where storage facilities for emergency supplies should be located, how large they should be, and how much of what commodities should be stored in each. This problem is defined more precisely in section 3 as a stochastic mixed integer optimization model.
Model Formulation
Let G = (N, A, U, C, F, Q) be an unreliable multisource multi-sink flow network defined by a set N of nodes, a set A of directed arcs, a set U of maximum capacities of A that vary with uncertain scenarios s S ∈ , a set C of costs per unit of flow on A, a set F of fixed unit costs per open facility, and a set Q of unit resource purchase costs. The scenario definitions include the variability in forecasted demand at nodes in the network for specific commodities, k∈K, as well as network arc capacities. The probability of occurrence of the scenario s is represented by P s , where
The potential for loss of material stored at nodes is represented by dividing each node into two separate twin nodes as shown in Figure 2 . One node contains the demand and is identified as n∈N while its twin is the supply node and is identified as n'∈N'⊂ N. Facilities can be located only at the nodes contained in set N'. As a default, the links connecting the twin nodes have an infinite capacity and a link cost of zero. In a scenario when the supply facility contained at node n' is destroyed due to the natural disaster, the capacity of the link (n', n) is set to zero: Demand for specific commodities that cannot be met in particular scenarios is "fulfilled" by flowing "pseudosupplies" from a source for unmet demand (labeled UD in Figure 2 ). Similarly, excess supplies at warehouses are sent to an "excess supply" sink node, labeled SE. The resource allocated at node UD is equal to the difference between the largest demand in any scenario and the total allocated resources in the network for each of the commodities.
Each arc (i,j)∈A is associated with a maximum If a storage facility is created at a given supply node, a fixed cost is incurred. We distinguish a set of different facility sizes that might be constructed, indexed by l. F l is the fixed cost associated with a facility of size class l. A facility of size class l has a capacity of M l .
Let y il be a binary decision variable equal to 1 if there is a supply facility of capacity category l located at node i, and 0 otherwise; and let Then the model can be formulated as a cost minimization as follows:
(ii) Arc capacity
(iii) Open facilities and facility capacity
The objective function minimizes the expected costs over all scenarios resulting from the selection of the supplier locations, the resource purchase and allocations to the supply facilities and the shipments of the supplies to the demand points, including the flow in the arcs that represent unmet demand and excess supplies. The model presented has characteristics of a "robust" optimization. Robust models, as defined by Mulvey et al. [13] , combine goal programming with scenario-based descriptions of the problem data in order to yield solutions that are less sensitive to uncertain data. Two types of robustness are defined by Mulvey, et al.: model robustness and solution robustness. A proposed solution is model robust if it is nearly feasible for all scenarios. It is solution robust if it remains close to optimal under all scenarios. The concepts of "nearly" and "close to" are made operational via penalty functions. In the model of interest here, the principal way to violate feasibility in some scenarios is an inability to meet demand. This is handled via the UD node in the model network and the penalty costs associated with unmet demand. The level of unmet demand is equivalent to the total flow emanating from the UD node to all the nodes in the network except to the SE node. If excess supply is created, that is also penalized via the holding costs and the SE node in the network. Thus, the model has built into it the mechanisms to create a robust solution that will function well under a wide variety of scenarios.
The model formulation has been influenced by several previous facility location and resource allocation models that have incorporated network reliability in their formulations. An example of such a facility location model was developed by Berman et al. [3] who added reliability of service with a nonlinear programming model to maximize the expected demand met with satisfactory service. They measured the quality of service by the distance traveled by the supply vehicles.
Few facility location models have included facility performance reliability during its operation, but one such model was provided by Snyder and Daskin [23] . They minimized fixed costs for opening the facilities and the expected transportation costs incurred due to facility failures. Similar to the model by Snyder and Daskin [23] the model developed here quantifies the effects of lack of reliability with additional transportation costs, but also with unmet demand penalty costs.
Hsieh and Chen [8, 9] developed resource allocation models for unreliable networks, using multi-source multisink flow networks that minimize the quantities of resources required at the source nodes in order to satisfy demand. In their models the arcs and the intermediate nodes in the network are unreliable and are modeled as statistically independent random variables. Contrary to the model formulated here, their models restrict the overall transmission costs incurred, force all the resources located at the facilities to be shipped and the demand to be met.
For the illustrative case study in this paper, it is quite reasonable to solve the stochastic optimization in extensive form. That is, the sets of constraints for each individual scenario can be written explicitly, and the problem can be solved as a single large linear programming (LP) problem. When the number of scenarios is limited and the scope of the problem is not too large, this is an attractive solution strategy because it can be accomplished using standard LP software (in this case, LINGO). As the problem size grows, however, extensive solution becomes unattractive and other solution techniques must be pursued.
We are currently developing a solution strategy for large-scale problems using an approach known as the integer L-shaped method [4, 11] . This method combines branch-and-bound techniques with the L-shaped method created by Van Slyke and Wets [26] . The branch-andbound technique ensures the integrality of the solution of the first-stage variables y il , while the L-shaped method relaxes the formulation by approximating the solution of the second-stage problem. The resulting algorithm takes advantage of the block structure of the overall problem and the ease of computation of the recourse sub-problems (i.e. multi-commodity network flow problems).
Solution and Implications in the Example Problem
In addition to the data on the network and scenarios contained in Section 2, we require values for the arc costs and nominal capacities, facility costs and size categories, and commodity purchase costs and volumes for the example problem.
The arc costs are assigned based on distance between nodes, and the nominal capacity of all arcs is set at 2000 units of flow. The capacities of specific arcs are reduced to 1000 units or 0 in particular scenarios, as specified in Section 2.
The commodity purchase costs are for normalized units (e.g., 1000 gallons of water), to make them consistent with the units of demand. The unit costs and storage volume requirements are presented in Table 5 . Three facility size categories are considered, with capacities and initial fixed costs as specified in Table 6 . The penalty incurred for excess supply (i.e. holding costs) is set at 25% of the unit purchase price of each commodity, and the penalty for unmet demand is set at 5 times the purchase price. The first-stage portion of the solution provided by the model is summarized in Table 7 . Five storage sites are selected, with small facilities in New Orleans (node 13), Key West (node 30) and at the intersection of I-10 and I-55 (node 12, north of New Orleans). Large facilities are located at Columbia, SC (node 19) and Tampa (node 28). No medium-sized facilities are opened, and no facilities are opened in locations susceptible to loss in the 21 specified scenarios (i.e. located at landfall points). Even though node 12 does not have any demand, that location was chosen because it can easily provide supplies to Baton Rouge (node 11), New Orleans (node 13) and Biloxi (node 14) − locations that are frequently threatened by hurricanes. The facility located at Key West (node 30) provides food to Miami (node 29), a node with high demand levels that does not itself have an open facility due to probability of hurricane damage.
The large facilities at Columbia (node 19) and Tampa (node 28) stock all three commodities, and are sited where they can provide aid effectively to other nodes in the eastern half of the network, where the heaviest demands are most likely in the defined scenarios. Small  252  0  0  13  Small  251  0  89  19  Large  4847  899  3616  28  Large  4210  1849  70  30  Small  0  437  0 The two small facilities in Louisiana stock mostly water, which is relatively expensive (compared to its weight and cost) to transport over long distances. This helps cover potential demands for water in the western part of the network, but in the event of storms in Louisiana or Texas, all three commodities are transported from the large facilities further east.
The model allocates enough water to satisfy the demand completely in all scenarios. The demands for food and medicine are fully met in most of the 21 scenarios, but in a few of the worst (i.e., highest demand) scenarios, there are some unmet demands for both food and medical kits. Figure 3 illustrates the percentages of demand for food that are met in each scenario. In four scenarios (6, 12, 13, and 18) , there is a shortage of food that ranges from 12% to 19% of demand. Scenarios 6, 12, 13 , and 18 are scenarios involving a hurricane that hits Miami directly (like Andrew). During these scenarios, the demand for food is not fully met at node 29 (Miami) because of transportation network capacity limits. This problem would not be overcome by having a facility at node 29, because in these scenarios that facility would be destroyed and its supplies would be lost. This result illustrates one way in which the model can be useful in highlighting potential constraints that could be critical in certain scenarios. Figure 4 illustrates the percentage of medical kit demand that is met in each of the 21 scenarios. Four of the six scenarios that have unmet demands are the same as for food, and the unmet demands arise for the same reason -transportation capacity constraints. There is unmet demand for medical kits in both Miami (node 29) and Key West (node 30). Node 30 is only connected to the rest of the network through node 29, so any resource reaching this node from other locations in the network must go through node 29. The only way medical kit demand can be satisfied completely at node 30 would be to increase the size of the facility located there. However, the penalty cost incurred for the unmet demand is less than the cost of increasing the facility capacity to a medium-sized facility. If multiple small facilities were allowed, or there were more facility size classes available, this solution might be different. For scenarios 10 and 17, the demand for medical kits could not be satisfied for nodes (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 22, and 23) and for nodes (7, 8, 13, 14, 15, 17, 22, 23) , respectively. Each of these scenarios combines the damage caused by hurricane Floyd with a major hurricane (Camille or Alicia). The resulting demands for medical kits are higher than the supply available in the network. To meet the demand in these two scenarios, more medical kits would need to be purchased. However, the probability of occurrence of these scenarios is low (each at 0.018) and the transportation arc capacities are limiting the distribution of supplies.
To show the flow patterns for distributing the allocated resources (i.e. the second stage solution), the diagrams for the multi-commodity flow network for scenarios 18 and 17 are presented in Figures 5 and 6 . These two scenarios were chosen for illustration because they represent cases where there is significant damage to the transportation network combined with high demands for relief supplies distributed across different parts of the network. Thus, these scenarios strain the system.
In scenario 18 (shown in Figure 5 ), the path connecting nodes 12, 14, 15, and 24 is destroyed. This disconnects the demand at nodes 14 and 15 from the closest potential supplier (located at node 12). As a result, supplies are moved from further east (nodes 19 and 28). Note also the arc capacity limits constraining movements down the east coast from node 19 to node 29. In this scenario, the demand for water is completely satisfied, but the demand for food and medical kits cannot be met at nodes 29 and 30 due to transportation network capacity restrictions.
As can be seen in Figure 6 , for scenario 17 the path from node 12 to node 24 is completely destroyed by Camille and the link connecting nodes 17 and 20 is destroyed by Floyd. In this scenario, Florida is unaffected and the supplies located at nodes 28 and 30 are sent to the north and west. The transportation capacity constraints are again binding on several arcs, including all those leaving Florida. In this scenario, the demand for medical kits is not completely met because the warehouse with available space (at node 28) could not move them to meet the demand, even if they were available. Transportation capacity constraints are likely to be a significant influence in a variety of real situations, and this example illustrates how they can affect resource allocation decisions and flow patterns in specific scenarios. 
Conclusions and Next Steps
Natural and/or man-made disasters, although infrequent, occur suddenly and leave high levels of devastation behind. Immediately after such an event, large quantities of supplies and response units are needed. If these supplies are not available and need to be transported long distances, increases in costs and casualties occur. While previous emergency response models have concentrated on resource allocation models in the aftermath of a disaster, when supply quantities are limited, this document presents a robust stochastic mixed integer program that can serve as a proactive strategy planning tool to counteract the effects of disasters. The model determines the most accessible emergency supply locations and optimal quantities of resources that need to be acquired, based on uncertain demand and unreliable network information.
An example is shown where the model provides a plan that can help prepare a multi-state region against the threats of various hurricanes, with different trajectories and intensities. The solution successfully meets the demand for water in all tested scenarios, and meets the demand for food and medical kits in all but the most extreme scenarios. Transportation arc capacity constraints limit the flows of materials in the most extreme scenarios, and this leads to some unmet demands.
The size of the example problem is kept modest by limiting the number of scenarios considered, limiting the number of size categories of possible storage facilities, and using a relatively aggregate network representation.
This problem can then be solved extensively, using a commercial LP package. As larger problems are considered, this solution strategy will become unrealistic, and other solution methods will have to be developed. One approach that appears quite promising is an algorithm based on the integer L-shaped method, and we are pursuing this avenue at present.
There is also additional insight that is likely to be gained by continuing to perform experiments with the current example problem, exploring sensitivity of the solution to various parameter changes. A program of further experimentation with the example is also underway currently.
